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Research of Subsidies for New Energy Vehicle Enterprise Based on Evolutionary Game Model

Author(s)

Taiyong Zhong, Qin Gao*

Affiliation(s)

Shanghai Communications Polytechnic, Shanghai, China *Corresponding Author.

Abstract

In the context of China's subsidy incentive strategy for new energy vehicles, this paper attempts to dynamically analyze the impact of total social benefits and subsidy amounts on the subsidy incentive strategy, as well as the evolutionary path of automobile enterprises' participation, using the theory and methods of evolutionary game theory. To promote the rapid development of the new energy vehicle industry, the paper further analyzes the impact of the subsidy incentive strategy on the evolutionary outcomes. The analysis results indicate that when automobile enterprises actively participate in new energy vehicle research and development (R&D), the greater the probability of excess returns they obtain, which will contribute to the evolution of the entire system towards a common development direction. Additionally, the higher the subsidy costs that the state incurs for actively participating in new energy vehicle R&D, the greater the likelihood of both the state and enterprises adopting strategies for new energy vehicle R&D, thereby achieving the maximization of overall social welfare.

Keywords

Game Theory; New Energy Vehicles; Subsidy Incentives; Evolutionary Game

References

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